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Rising aluminum costs cut into Ford's profit

When Ford reports fourth-quarter results on Wednesday afternoon, it is expected to fret that rising metals costs have cut into profits, even as rivals say they have the problem under control. Aluminum prices have risen 20 percent in the last year and nearly 11 percent since Dec. 11. Steel prices have risen just over 9 percent in the last year. Ford uses more aluminum in its vehicles than its rivals. Aluminum is lighter but far more expensive than steel, closing at $2,229 per tonne on Tuesday. U.S. steel futures closed at $677 per ton (0.91 metric tonnes). Republican U.S. President Donald Trump's administration is weighing whether to impose tariffs on imported steel and aluminum, which could push prices even higher. Ford gave a disappointing earnings estimate for 2017 and 2018 last week, saying the higher costs for steel, aluminum and other metals, as well as currency volatility, could cost the company $1.6 billion in 2018. Ford shares took a dive after the announcement. Ford Chief Financial Officer Bob Shanks told analysts at a conference in Detroit last week that while the company benefited from low commodity prices in 2016, rising steel prices were now the main cause of higher costs, followed by aluminum. Shanks said the automaker at times relies on foreign currencies as a "natural hedge" for some commodities but those are now going in the opposite direction, so they are not working. A Ford spokesman added that the automaker also uses a mix of contracts, hedges and indexed buying. Industry analysts point to the spike in aluminum versus steel prices as a plausible reason for Ford's problems, especially since it uses far more of the expensive metal than other major automakers. "When you look at Ford in the context of the other automakers, aluminum drives a lot of their volume and I think that is the cause" of their rising costs, said Jeff Schuster, senior vice president of forecasting at auto consultancy LMC Automotive. Other major automakers say rising commodity costs are not much of a problem. At last week's Detroit auto show, Fiat Chrysler Automobiles NV's Chief Executive Officer Sergio Marchionne reiterated its earnings guidance for 2018 and held forth on a number of topics, but did not mention metals prices. General Motors Co gave a well-received profit outlook last week and did not mention the subject. "We view changes in raw material costs as something that is manageable," a GM spokesman said in an email.

These horribly misguided front-drive design studies nearly became the Mustang

As we eagerly await the unveiling of the all-new sixth-generation Mustang, Ford has been giving us some great information over the past few months showing what has gone into shaping its venerable pony car. As many changes as the Mustang has gone through in its 50 years, though, it appears the fourth-gen model played a decisive and pivotal role in the car's future.
As is part of Mustang lore, the front-wheel drive Ford Probe was originally developed as a next-generation Mustang in the Eighties before cooler heads prevailed. The Blue Oval has just released a handful of images showing how bad things could have been - including a full-scale clay model of a front-wheel-drive Mustang (shown above). Fortunately, the FWD Mustang plan was scrapped and Ford went to work designing a rear-wheel-drive replacement for the Fox Body Mustang, with three design studies making it far enough to become full-scale models. These include the soft "Bruce Jenner" Mustang, the over-the-top "Rambo" Mustang and the middle-ground "Arnold Schwarzenegger" Mustang, which finally became the basis for the 1994 'Stang.
By early 1991, the design language of the fourth-generation Mustang had been worked out, and the rest, they say, is history. Scroll down for the fascinating press release telling the story of the fourth-gen Mustang, and be sure to check out the gallery of horribly misguided sketches and various design studies that were all on the table in the late 1980s.

Detroit and Silicon Valley: When cultures collide

Culture is a subject that rarely, if never, gets discussed when traditional auto companies buy — or hugely invest — in Silicon Valley-based companies. The conversation surrounding the investments is usually about how the tech looks appealing and how it's an appropriate step to move the automakers toward autonomy. Culture — the way things are done, the expectations, and the approaches — is something that is overlooked only at one's peril. The potential cultural gap is almost always evident in the obligatory photos of the participants in these deals, with is essentially a photo op of auto execs with their Silicon Valley counterparts. The former — rocking jeans and no ties — look like parochial school kids playing hooky. Don't worry: The regimental outfits will be back in place once they get back in the Eastern time zone. Consider what happened back in 1998 when Daimler bought Chrysler. First of all, there was a denial in Detroit that it happened. It was positioned as a "merger of equals." Which it wasn't. In any corporate situation, when one has more than 50 percent of the business, it owns the whole thing. And the German company was in the proverbial driver's seat. People who were around Auburn Hills back then kept their heads down and their German Made Simple books at hand. Things did not go well. Daimler had had enough by 2007, when it offloaded Chrysler to Cerberus Capital Management — which brought ex-Home Depot CEO Bob Nardelli into the picture, which is a story onto itself. But when you think about the Daimler-Chrysler situation, realize that these were two car companies (at least the Mercedes part of the Daimler organization), so they had that in common, and the language of engineers is something of an Esperanto based on math, so there was that, too. Yet it simply didn't work. It doesn't take too many viewings of HBO's Silicon Valley to know that the business people in that part of the world are far more aggressive than people who ordinarily head and control car companies in Detroit. About 20 years ago, a book came out about the founder of Oracle titled The Difference Between God and Larry Ellison* - and the asterisk on the book jacket leads to: God Doesn't Think He's Larry Ellison. It would be hard to imagine a book about a Detroit executive, even a book that had the decided bias that the tome about Ellison evinces, that would be quite so searing. Sure, there are egos. But they are still perceived to be, overall, "nice" people.